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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2139 
___________ 
 
KIMZIAH MORFIAH, as Administratrix of  
Estate of Adolphus K. Pinkney and in her own right 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; PO WALI SHABAZZ, individually and in his capacity as a 
Philadelphia Police Officer; JOHN DOE POLICE OFFICERS, individually and in their 
capacities as Philadelphia Police Officers 
 
                              Kimziah Morfiah, 
                                    Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 13-cv-05995) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 3, 2016 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed August 5, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Kimziah Morfiah, proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment entered after a jury 
trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 The parties are familiar with the facts, so we will only briefly revisit them here.  
On October 15, 2011, Philadelphia police officers Joseph Rapp and James Boone 
responded to a radio call reporting a person with a gun.  When the officers arrived at the 
scene, they encountered Morfiah’s son, Adolphus K. Pinkney.  Officer Boone realized 
that Pinkney was carrying a revolver and yelled, “Gun! Gun!”  Pinkney fired at Officer 
Rapp.  The officers returned fire, killing Pinkney.  Morfiah, proceeding in her own right 
and as administratrix of Pinkney’s estate, filed a counseled civil lawsuit against the City 
of Philadelphia and the police officers who were involved in the shooting.  Following a 
six-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.  Morfiah, proceeding 
pro se, appealed. 
 Morfiah argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the jury’s verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence.  In particular, she claims that the jury failed to 
consider inconsistencies in certain witnesses’ testimony, which affected their credibility.  
But because Morfiah did not file a motion for a new trial in the District Court, the issue is 
waived.  See Lesende v. Borrerro, 752 F.3d 324, 334 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The City’s failure 
to seek [a new trial on liability] from the District Court results in the waiver of that issue 
on appeal.”).  Although we have the discretion to review waived issues, we have limited 
such review to cases presenting exceptional circumstances.  Webb v. City of Phila., 562 
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F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2009).  Morfiah’s challenge to the weight of the evidence does not 
present an exceptional circumstance.  Indeed, the jury’s verdict was supported by the 
testimony of the police officers, a pathologist, and a crime scene investigator.  Cf. 
Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1076 (3d Cir. 1996) (en 
banc) (holding that a new trial should be granted only where the “great weight” of the 
evidence cuts against the verdict and “where a miscarriage of justice would result if the 
verdict were to stand.”).  According to the testimony of those witnesses, the officers shot 
Pinkney immediately after he fired at them with a revolver, Pinkney was not shot after he 
died, and his body was not dragged across the street.  See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 
1, 11-12 (1985) (providing that it is not constitutionally unreasonable to use deadly force 
where a police officer has good reason “to believe that the suspect poses a significant 
threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.”). 
 Morfiah further alleges that the paramedics who responded to the shooting were 
negligent.  We will not consider this claim, however, because it was not raised in the 
District Court.  See Harris v. City of Phila., 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994).  
Furthermore, although Morfiah complains about her attorney’s performance at trial, there 
is no right to effective counsel in a civil case.  See Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 
620 F.2d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 1980).  Rather, the remedy in such a case is a malpractice 
action against the attorney.  Id.   
 Morfiah also raises several challenges to the trial judge’s management of the trial.  
For instance, she alleges that the trial judge did not properly respond when a juror fell 
asleep during opening statements, when one of her witnesses had an outburst at the end of 
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the day that was overheard by the jurors,1 and when a defendant police officer 
“aggressively stared” at her family and witnesses.  We conclude, however, that the trial 
judge appropriately addressed each of these incidents.  See Duquesne Light Co. v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 609 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that a District Court’s 
“decisions in its management of a trial [are reviewed] for abuse of discretion.”).   
 The trial judge and counsel for both parties discussed the sleeping juror.  
Morfiah’s attorney agreed that the juror did not need to be removed and did not object to 
the trial judge’s proposal that the clerk remind the juror at the beginning of each day not 
to sleep.  With respect to the outburst, which involved a witness loudly indicating that he 
was being taunted by a defendant, the trial judge questioned each of the jurors about what 
they heard, about the witness’s statements outside the courtroom, and about whether they 
could continue to be fair and impartial.  After the jurors said that they could, defendants’ 
attorney stated that he would not move for a mistrial and the trial judge permitted the case 
to go forward.  Finally, according to reports made to the trial judge, one of the police 
officer defendants aggressively stared at Morfiah’s family and witnesses.  In response, 
the trial judge told the officer that “[i]f it is occurring, I would ask you to stop.”  The trial 
judge further noted that “this is a volatile situation” and warned the officer that “we could 
end up with a mistrial.”  After being questioned by the trial judge, none of the jurors 
indicated that they had observed any behavior by any of the parties that gave them cause 
for concern.  Morfiah’s attorney did not object to this resolution.  Under these 
                                                                
1 Following this outburst, the witness attempted to apologize to the jurors as they exited 
the courtroom. 
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circumstances, we conclude that the trial judge properly addressed the sleeping juror, 
reasonably concluded that the jury could render an impartial verdict, and appropriately 
addressed the allegations concerning the officer’s behavior. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
